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“Online Misogyny and the Alternative Right: Debating the Undebatable” 
 
Abstract  
The aim of this critical intervention is two-fold; first, to offer a few insights to the online 
misogyny debate based on a case-study involving myself and Milo Yiannopoulos, the 
prominent anti-feminist and self-styled ultra-conservative “bad boy;”1 second, to add a new, 
politically pronounced inflection to the meticulous work in the field (Emma Jane, 2014a, 
2014b, 2016; Alison Phipps, 2016; Hester Baer, 2016; Rosalind Gill, 2016; Debbie Ging, 
2016, 2017; Divya Maharajh, 2014; Anita Sarkeesian 2012), by arguing that although 
misogyny is not exclusively affiliated with a certain political register (Richard Seymour, 
2013; Edward Platt, 2014),
 
its ferocious articulations in contemporary culture – especially 
online – should be understood as a type of discourse fuelled largely by a set of well organised 
far-right, white supremacist determinations collectively camouflaged by the media-friendly 
term “alternative-right” (hereafter, “alt-right”). I contend that far from being a subculture that 
seeks to articulate a credible anti-establishment position (Allum Bokhari and Milo 
Yiannopoulos, 2016), the alt-right is better understood as a polished, technologically adept 
strand of the far-right – a strand, what is more, that is easily assimilable by neoliberal socio-
economic and political rationality. Much like neoliberalism itself (Wendy Brown, 2015; 
David Harvey, 2005), the alt-right is vehemently opposed to any form of politics or political 
imaginary that seeks to establish a socialist or socialist-democratic hegemony predicated on 
class consciousness, collectivism, and egalitarianism.   
 
Introduction  
 In early April 2015, I received an e-mail from two of our third-year students working on a 
practice-based dissertation on “lad culture,” asking me to take part in a debate with Milo 
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Yiannopoulos, who was then better known for being a senior editor at Breitbart News.
2 
For 
their project, our students had already interviewed scholars such as Alison Phipps – director 
of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Sussex – and media industry 
professionals such as Martin Daubney, former editor of the “lad magazine” Loaded, and Sally 
Peck, the Telegraph’s family and travel editor. At the time, even though I was broadly aware 
of Yiannopoulos’ notoriety, I had no real knowledge of his ideas or of his debating style. In 
the end, after a hasty examination of his output, I questioned my students’ decision to provide 
a platform to a man whose sole purpose, it seemed to me, was to provoke. That said, and 
given that Yiannopoulos had accepted their invitation, I agreed to participate so that there 
would be a debate and not an interview.  The debate was filmed and disseminated in its 
entirety on Brighton TV, a student-led YouTube channel associated with the University of 
Brighton. The debate may be found on YouTube, while viewers were also invited to 
comment on the Twitter hashtag #theladdebate. While Brighton TV output normally attracts 
between two and three hundred views per clip, views of this debate counted in the thousands 
within the first day of release; this, I soon discovered, was to be expected given 
Yiannopoulos’ Twitter followers who, at the time of the debate, were over forty thousand.3 I 
should also say that since its first appearance the debate has attracted over one hundred and 
thirty-four thousand views.
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Reflecting on the debate and on the ensuing vitriol by a veritable army of 
Yiannopoulos’ followers led me to the following conclusions. First, I observed that beyond 
the rather imaginative linguistic formulations, a few of which I had to look up, the e-bile 
(Jane, 2014) levelled at me was by no means politically neutral. Second, it was clear that the 
invective was aimed, to an overwhelming extent, at my sexualised, objectified and feminised 
body. This, of course, does not mean that I was thought of, or treated as, a woman; rather, 
that I was discursively treated as one in order to be sexualised and, in tandem, objectified. 
3 
 
 
Within the boundaries of such online attacks, and depending on one’s vantage point, 
emasculation – here, as a rhetorical insult – is either a typical form of abuse (Jane, 2016, 564-
565; Debbie Ging, 2017), or the result of a wider cultural paradigm that sees non-macho 
forms of masculinity as not “male” at all (Laura García-Favaro and Rosalind Gill, 2016). It 
became clear to me while reading the politically inflected comments posted on several online 
platforms, that, for the far-right, there is no abuse more impactful than that which exists 
within the realms of misogyny; indeed, for the overwhelming majority of contributors – and 
as others have argued (Jane, 2016; Gill, 2016; Phipps, 2016) – there seemed to be no possible 
abuse (or even critique) outside a discourse in (and for) which “woman,” the “female body,” 
and “femininity” are perennial objects: to be used, evaluated, exploited, degraded, humiliated, 
and, of course, controlled. Tellingly, abuse seemed to dissipate once it became clear that the 
feminist position was occupied by a man who, as one Twitter user brazenly put it, “was not 
playing the victim card.” In other words, despite their disgust over my siding with the 
“feminazis,” an act which in their eyes bore testament to my “emasculation,” I was, at the end 
of the day, still a man – a sheep gone astray, if you will. In other words, to their mind, the fact 
that I was a man somehow enabled me to receive their abuse in a way that set me apart from 
their traditional targets: women. As such, no one threatened to subject me to doxxing,
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 and no 
one threatened to rape me, cut my head off, and/or rape/kill my children (Jane, 2014; 2016).  
However, it also became clear that being a man who is a feminist and a Marxist, laid 
one bare to a series of peripheral attacks predicated, on the one hand, on one’s perceived 
inability to produce an argument as “a man would,” and, secondly, on one’s political 
affiliations collectively (mis)understood by all strands of the far-right as “cultural Marxism.” 
According to the overwhelming majority of the comments, not only did I fail in my task to 
defend my ill-conceived politics, but I also committed an act of gender-treason for going 
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against the global brotherhood of men, the consequence of which was my ceasing to occupy 
the position of “manhood” at all.  
 
Debating the undebatable  
The debate was a car-crash – at least as far as I was concerned. Aghast at what I was hearing 
come out of Yiannopoulos’ mouth, I was trying to control my anger – he was, after all, my 
students’ guest – while trying to put forward a research-backed argument. I realised very 
quickly, however, that research-backed arguments matter precious little when pitted against a 
form of rhetoric that is predicated almost exclusively on attention-seeking soundbites (the 
wacky left), on inconsistency (radical feminists, according to Yiannopoulos, are a minority 
but they also run the world), and on downright bigotry – asked what he would do with 
women who allege rape, Yiannopoulos replied they ought to be told to “grow up.” Alas, the 
case of Brock Turner, the Stanford University swimmer cum rapist of intoxicated women 
who got off with a ridiculously short custodial sentence, had not come to light yet; nor had, 
indeed, the multiple sexual assault and sexual harassment allegations against the likes of Bill 
O’Reilly of Fox News, and Harvey Weinstein, the all-powerful Hollywood film producer.  
It was a mistake to debate him on these terms and, with hindsight, I concur with 
Laurie Penny for whom Yiannopoulos’ “performative bigotry,” lauded as strength by his alt-
right devotees, should deter any conscientious interlocutor from entering into a debate bereft 
of an ethics of discussion (Penny, 2016). The appeal of such rhetoric has been defined by 
Ruth Wodak as indicative of the “arrogance of ignorance” (2015, 2) of the far-right, a type of 
argumentation which “appeals to common-sense and anti-intellectualism” and “mark[s] a 
return to pre-modernist or pre-Enlightenment thinking’ (2015, 2).    
For the purposes of this article, I relay a short precis of the debate and its most 
pertinent strands below before I proceed to delineate the basic tenor of the invective directed 
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at my person. I will use this invective to substantiate my central argument that online 
misogyny is a form of political performance which, however facilitated by the sleek digital 
veneer of social media, is in fact redolent of deeply embedded social problems further fuelled 
by what Alison Phipps and Isabel Young call “retro-sexist,” “neoliberalised” forms of 
masculine competitiveness and misogyny (Alison Phipps and Isabel Young, 2015).  In the 
same vein, the online comments will help us understand, I will argue, the alt-right not as a 
subversive subculture, but as a movement deeply embedded within the history of the far-
right, and as a performance of the post-2008 neoliberal imaginary.  
The debate started with definitions – the moderator asked us both for a definition of 
“lad culture.” Yiannopoulos said that it defined boys or young men who were “boisterous” 
and prone to “let[ting] off steam,” while I said it was a complex phenomenon with deep 
social, cultural and political roots. Yiannopoulos then continued that men were at a 
“structural disadvantage,” and that boisterous young boys these days grow up according to 
“feminist standards;” he continued that “feminists and other minorities” have now become 
socially and culturally hegemonic – here, he mentioned that “women under thirty now earn 
more than men for the same job” – and that this has left men feeling disoriented. To counter 
that, I proceeded to relay the results of the latest World Economic Forum (WEF) Equality 
Report (2014), which contained very worrying data about gender equality in the UK. My 
interlocutor rejected the WEF conclusions (and my style) as “journalistic”. Asked by the 
moderator whether he thought there was a crisis with men, he noted that “men worry” about 
being laughed at and/or about being considered as “potential rapists;” further, he argued that 
there is an “unreconstructed,” “purist” form of masculinity which men should be able to 
express. To the same question, I answered that there was indeed a crisis with young people – 
student debt, having to work more for less and so on – while Yiannopoulos, after a brief 
reference to the ways in which the “wacky left” has accommodated “whingeing” and 
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“whining” women, changed the tenor of the discussion by suggesting that there are essential 
features of masculinity – which he defined as “virtues” (competitiveness, strength, physical 
aggression) – before playfully concluding that “men are pigs.” Addressing the so called 
phenomenon of “rape culture” in contemporary Higher Education, he continued that “women 
use their sexuality as a weapon,” and when asked what we are supposed to do with women 
who allege rape, he concluded that we ought to take them in a room and tell them to “grow 
up” because the real world is much more dangerous than the cloistered walls of academe.  
Finally, he argued in favour of a biological basis for sexual difference before concluding that 
the world – Western civilisation – was the result of male genius, and that women’s 
professional choices, albeit calibrated to a certain extent by culture, society, politics and/or 
history, may be better explained by biology and some sort of genius distribution index, 
according to which men are, on average, more intelligent than women.  
Judging from Yiannopoulos’ reaction (and that of his online followers), the most 
infuriating of my assertions was that if a woman feels harassed (or, indeed, assaulted), then 
we must understand that she has been harassed (or, indeed, assaulted). Of course, in saying so 
I did not mean that there are no misunderstandings or, indeed, cases in which men have been 
wrongfully accused of such offences. However, it became very clear, very quickly, during the 
course of the debate, that conclusions mobilising data from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabularies (HMIC) and
 
peer-reviewed academic research  were collectively dismissed by 
Yiannopoulos as orchestrated feminazi propaganda seeking to establish a new gender order, 
in which misunderstood men are the real victims. These reports show that sexual crimes 
against women by men are not only overwhelmingly more frequent and on the rise, but are 
also significantly under-reported (HMIC, 2014, 18). Since it became obvious to me that all 
such data mattered little to Yiannopoulos, I argued that the perception of a bodily or cognitive 
experience as unwanted, unsolicited, abusive or, indeed, scarring, ought to be taken as such 
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and be dealt with accordingly. That said, and beyond the fundamental inconsistency of his 
argument – on the one hand, “men are pigs,” on the other, women tend to exaggerate while 
using their sexuality as a weapon – it seems that without openly condoning sexual assault 
against women, Yiannopoulos adopts a fundamentally far-right position on women’s rights: 
sexual advances from men ought to be accommodated and understood as something natural 
that men just do, and that while women may meaningfully contribute to the public sphere, 
first, they must acknowledge that their primary expertise lies within the private sphere – the 
family home (Melissa Deckman, 2016; Ronnee Schreiber, 2008) – and, second, they must 
accept that men are better suited to rule, to govern, and, of course, to legislate – even when 
legislation concerns women’s bodies, and/or women’s civil and reproductive rights  (Chris 
Hedges, 2008, 73-94; Deckman, 2016, 176-200).    
      
Rebels on the right – or misogynists, far-right champions, and neoliberal cheer-leaders   
 
Although, for the sake of space, it is not possible to relay here all the responses that our 
debate instigated on various online platforms, I give below selected samples from YouTube 
and Twitter which reveal the tenor of the attack. Those included have not been edited in any 
way other than omitting repetitive comments for the sake of space. Invective focuses 
overwhelmingly on a) my lack of virility, b) the shape of my body, c) my having renounced 
my masculinity for feminine mannerisms and female genitalia – “mangina” was a recursive 
form of abuse – and, finally, d) on my inability to measure up to Yiannopoulos’s superior 
intellect because of all the above.  
YouTube comments  
 
RATCHILDUK: […] This giant fucking mangina has the gall to say that if a woman 
feels she was sexual harassed then it MUST have been harassment. 
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MERCER VIRUS: Where do these issues come from insecure fat women or filthy 
JEWS 
PLAY OFOZ: The mangina does critical theory, in short a ball busting communist. 
SEANYBOO1969: […] That fat fucking smarmy twat, i so wanted to punch his lights 
out […] futher education has become regressive house of Cultural Marxist idiocy & 
identity politics on steroids! […] I'm proud to be a white straight British man steeped in 
"Lad" working class culture, & any minority who feels threatened by this can kiss my 
white male arse […] this so called academic, as well as Feminists & the hard political 
left who have a stranglehold upon academia say fuck all about other ethnic/cultural 
groups who are committing far more real sexual/geneder/hateful horrors around us […] 
FemiNAZIs & people like this fat cunt proff' say nothing about muslims on campus 
segregating audiences, attacking women for been uncovered, they say nothing about the 
rampant culturally & racist rape & grooming of many thousands (latest report states as 
many as one fucking MILLION) white British underage girls by black & brown muslim 
men over 2 decades!  […] Only good thing about him & all those like him, is when 
civilization falls because of their crack pot meddeling & the destructive policies they've 
pushed, & we regress back to a simpler (but more brutal) time of survival of the fittest, 
us lads with our "Lad Culture", will be winners & we'll have someone to canabalize & 
eat when the food stops been delivered to Tescos ! First dibs on Academio Manginaio 
fatso, i bet i could make him last me a year! 
 
Twitter comments (#TheLadDebate)  
@theokoulouris (12/04/2015)  
#theladdebate @Nero imagine the mayhem if I actually were a woman. They would 
have actually threatened to cut my head off and rape it. 
@adiabat79 (12/04/2015)  
@theokoulouris @Nero Nah. The main difference is that you aren’t playing-the-
victim. That's what causes the online threats #theLadDebate 
 
Beyond my etiolated masculinity, it is clear to me that the contributors cannot construct a 
critique outside the realm of misogyny. Anything associated with the female body, or a 
perceived performance of femininity, sexual or otherwise, is worthy of contempt. Not only 
that, but the hierarchical position of the genders – male / subject, female / object – is taken as 
natural – that is to say, biologically determined – and as such axiomatic. Any deviation from 
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this norm warrants contempt, ridicule and threats of violence. Yet, comparing the invective 
directed at my person with that directed at women feminists (Jane 2014, 2016), it becomes 
obvious that, however offensive, the abuse against male feminists compares poorly with the 
invective and threats of violence directed at female feminists (Jane, 2014, 564-565). It seems, 
what is more, that Yiannopoulos’ followers do not object to my feminism as a matter of 
socio-cultural or political positioning, but to the fact that being a man I renounce, so to speak, 
my perceived natural superiority. According to the last tweet above, my natural masculine 
superiority enabled me to overcome hurt and stop playing the “victim card.” In short, in the 
eyes of the alt-right, even a “smarmy,” out of shape “mangina” like me is de facto superior to 
the countless women who have received torrents of abuse online. This, I suppose, is because, 
ultimately, I do not have a “pussy” that they can “break irreparably” (Jane, 2014, 563) and, 
therefore, I am neither biologically nor symbolically subject to such forms of sexual violence. 
That said, despite the fact that such abuse is not always produced by men, its semasiological 
currency is at all times bounded by the axiomatic power (physical, sexual, cultural) that men 
have – or ought to have – over women. And this, to be sure, is a position to which all forms 
of the far-right – from paleoconservatism to the alt-right – seem to be adhering (Mathew 
Lyons, 2017a, 2017b; Deckman, 2016; Schreiber, 2008).      
Certainly, these comments are not devoid of political valence. The long YouTube 
comment above is particularly telling. In a veritable tour de force that fuses misogyny, 
racism, anti-intellectualism, anti-Semitism and islamophobia with a visceral hatred of the left, 
SEANYBOO1969 even provides an eschatological solution to the inevitable according to 
him fall of (Western) civilisation: literally, eat the left. Though claiming an “oppressed” 
status – whether by “feminazis” or by “political correctness” more widely – these 
contributors occupy positions of exceptional confidence as they set out to attack the general 
tenets of a roughly conceptualised “liberal” or “progressive” left that, in their eyes, has 
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facilitated the triumph of a diverse array of so called “identity politics” over an equally 
roughly conceptualised notion of white, western masculinity. The Manichean nature of this 
approach pits feminists, liberals, Jews, and left-wing academics, against a strong, sinewy, 
straight-talking and, above all, white masculinity, whose cultural and/or political aspirations 
cannot be accommodated by the, according to them, relentless as well as collective flight into 
political correctness. Though this claim should be taken to have been partly remedied by the 
advent of a “straight-talking,” white US Commander-in-Chief who “grabs women by the 
pussy,” the alt-right’s understanding of itself is predicated, first and foremost, not, as it seeks 
to suggest, on an enlightened struggle against “the establishment,” but on a fanatical 
opposition to any hue of Marxist politics punctuated by class consciousness, egalitarianism, 
solidarity, and internationalism. As such, and as I try to argue below, far from being a 
movement beyond the clutches of neoliberal conservatism – an ideology it seeks to disavow – 
the alt-right may be better understood as a particularly successful and thus utterly insidious 
performance of neoliberalism itself.  
In one of the most popular online articles on the alt-right written for Breitbart, Allum 
Bokhari and Milo Yiannopoulos argue that it is “an amorphous movement” (2016). Writing 
in the third-person, presumably to maintain a veneer of journalistic objectivity, the authors 
argue that the alt-right comprises young, creative, provocative activists, who inhabit the most 
subversive, underground corners of the internet (Bhokari and Yiannopoulos, 2016). The 
authors proceed to provide the intellectual genealogy of the movement, in which they include 
the white supremacist Richard Spencer, the gay masculinist Jack Donovan, a sprinkling of the 
French New Right – the “neoreactionaries” (also known as #NRx) – before concluding with 
the social anthropologist Jonathan Haidt, whose work on what he calls “the conservative 
mind” Bokhari and Yiannopoulos summarise (Bokhari and Yiannopoulos, 2016).  At the 
heart of the authors’ commentary lies the enlightened individual – protective of his culture 
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and yearning to be free – who comes head to head with the dictates of liberal politics and 
liberal society: economic and cultural oppression, self-censorship, identity politics, and the 
need to pay lip service to political correctness (Bokhari and Yiannopoulos, 2016). 
Interestingly, it seems that the only gripe the alt-right has with the left is that the latter insists 
on the importance of equality as a necessary condition of liberty – just as much as it insists on 
liberty as the enabling condition of equality –6 and on the promotion of an internationalism 
that unites people according to class more than it does according to culture.  
Although the ideological antecedence of the alt-right fuses aspects of 
paleoconservatism with strands of the European New Right (Lyons, 2016), the glue that links 
all strands of the far-right – from the “mama grizzlies” of the Tea-Party movement 
(Deckman, 2016) to the alt-right (Lyons, 2017) – is trenchant opposition to all socio-
economic, cultural and political propositions based on egalitarianism and collectivity: trade-
unionism, anti-capitalist resistance, and gender/racial equality. For all the self-proclaimed 
intelligence, creativity, and eagerness of its members to carve a path away from “the 
establishment” – a singularly facile but eminently marketable term that bundles together a 
politics ranging from the “cultural Marxism” of the Frankfurt School to the stratocratic 
financialism of the Bush and Clinton administrations – I read the alt-right as yet another far-
right formation enabled by post-2008 neoliberalism; more precisely, as a strand of militant 
neoliberalism that turns inwards seeking to defend free market economics from the post-2008 
electoral advances of the left.  
Since the 2008 crisis the champions of neoliberalism have been actively engaged with 
the task of shifting blame away from the calamities of their own making: financial 
deregulation, deindustrialisation, and privatisation of public assets. Feeling vulnerable, 
neoliberal advocates in all structures of the social hierarchy appear ruthless. This is by no 
means an exaggeration. We need only recall the way in which the neoliberal consensus of the 
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European Union dealt with the rise of the radical left in Europe – Podemos in Spain was 
broadly neutralised, but SYRIZA in Greece was utterly crashed (Helena Sheehan, 2016) – or 
how Bernie Sanders’s presidential campaign was undermined by the neoliberal nucleus of the 
DNC. What is more, the developments after the June 2017 General Elections in post-
referendum Britain cannot be ignored. Jeremy Corbyn’s decisive break with (New) Labour’s 
neoliberal past and unprecedented success in inspiring broad sections of the British electorate 
– most importantly, the youth – forced the Conservatives into a humiliating Pyrrhic victory 
which lost them their majority in the House of Commons. Faced with the prospect of losing 
power and, therefore, the ability to further entrench neoliberal austerity in Britain, the 
Conservatives did not hesitate to forge an unholy alliance with Northern Ireland’s Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP). This development does not only complicate the strict impartiality of 
the British state in Northern Ireland under the Good Friday Agreement (Daniel Finn, 2017), 
but further complicates Britain’s relationship with its colonial past by unproblematically re-
emphasising the platitudinous currency of “Britishness,” and, of course, the question of race – 
especially post-Brexit (Nadine El-Enany, 2017). What is more, the DUP’s positions on 
gender equality, LGBT rights and climate change, all sit very uncomfortably within 
neoliberalism’s putative commitment to all forms of gender and sexual politics that serve its 
purpose.
7
 However, since one of the functions of neoliberalism is the absorption and 
appropriation of democratic opposition (Brown, 2015; Harvey, 2005; Mark Blyth, 2013; 
Petrus Zuidhof, 2012),
8
 and since its perverse morality of trickle-down economics remains 
largely unassailable by the political and economic rationality of traditional and new media 
(Tom Mills, 2016; Henry Giroux, 2011; Jodi Dean, 2010) , I do not see why it would not 
wholeheartedly absorb a technologically-driven, far-right ideology like that of the alt-right, 
an ideology which demonises the immigrant and the refugee but not the hedge fund manager, 
or an ideology which glorifies the “mama grizzly” but not the radical feminist; ultimately, 
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faced with the possibility of its extinction, neoliberalism does not hesitate to absorb and 
instrumentalise an ideology which valorises social Darwinism over egalitarianism, and 
promotes self-interested individuality over collective struggle.  
The assimilation of the far-right by mainstream politics has deep historical roots. 
Analysing European politics in the aftermath of the October Revolution, Gopal Balakrishnan 
argues that the inclusion of socialist elements in governments across Europe resulted, by and 
large, in the neutralisation of these elements and in the opening up of “an alternate modernity 
of the ‘revolution of the right’” (Hans Freyer, cited in Gopal Balakrishnan, 2017, 30). 
Therefore, Balakrishnan continues, “[s]ocialism … lost its position as the automatic recourse 
for all the partisans of change,” (Robert Paxton, cited in Balakrishnan, 2017, 30). Owen 
Worth, whose work explores the rise of the far-right post-1990s as a response to 
neoliberalism, argues that “[neoliberal democracy] has sought to build upon prejudices that 
have been a feature of the far-right (anti-immigration, welfare chauvinism) in a manner that 
complements market economics and in some way seeks to extend its hegemony” (Owen 
Worth, 2015, 154-155). Seen from within the analytical spectrum of Gramsci’s hegemony, 
Worth argues that the far-right has succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of electorates 
because it managed to focus on what it perceived to be the negative side-effects of 
globalisation, and because it successfully combined attractive right-wing, populist rhetoric – 
anti-immigration, anti-multiculturalism, anti-EU, and (importantly) anti-women – with a 
commitment to neoliberal market economics. I argue that, mutatis mutandis, this observation 
holds true in post-Maastricht European politics not only in relation to the neoliberal 
consensus of the EU, but, more worryingly, in relation to the legitimation of the far-right as a 
credible political movement.    
 It would be superfluous on my part to list the advances of the far-right in several 
European countries here (Antonis Ellinas, 2010, 2013, 2015; Wodak, 2015; Paul Hainsworth, 
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2008; Bert Klandermans and Nonna Mayer, 2006). I contend, however, that beyond narrow 
cultural and national differences, the arch-enemy of all far-right nationalisms is an 
emancipatory politics that seeks to shift blame from the multiple “others” of contemporary 
life – immigrants, refugees, Muslims – to the iniquities of transnational capital, deregulated 
finance, and relentless privatisation of public assets (Wodak, 2015, 191-208). If there is 
something to be gleaned from all this is that, sanctified by the hollow process of majoritarian 
parliamentarism, neoliberal democracy – to the extent that it can, and in so far as it does not 
harm its interests – has no qualms in absorbing the far-right even when, on a surface level, 
doing so opposes its basic tenets. Golden Dawn’s eighteen neo-Nazi MPs in the Greek 
Parliament are case in point. What is not very well known is that alongside their brutal 
campaign of violence against anything and anyone they hold responsible for Greece’s 
humiliation – immigrants, refugees, the Jews, and the Muslim world tout court – Golden 
Dawn’s MPs tabled over one-hundred and forty parliamentary motions in favour of Greece’s 
shipping capital in the first eighteen months of their tenure. And, to be sure, their well-
documented campaign of violence, which resulted in the murder of the Greek rapper Pavlos 
Fyssas in 2013, has been complemented by their extreme misogyny, which culminated in a 
shocking, and by now notorious, incident, in which Ilias Kasidiaris – Golden Dawn’s press 
spokesman and all-round Nazi macho-man – repeatedly slapped Liana Kannelli – a 
prominent MP of Greece’s Communist Party (KKE) – on national television.  
Scholars have sought to map the emergence of the far-right in diverse ways and from 
different disciplinary vantage points. Settling the politico-cultural identity of the 1960s, 
Rebecca Klatch argues that while it is true that the mass student movements of the 1960s, 
especially in the US, aligned largely with the New Left, the decade should also be interpreted 
as “the incubation stage for [future] conservative movements” (1994, 199). Further, she 
argues that forms of counter- or subculture provided the 1960s New Right with the legitimacy 
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and the means to “foment political activism (Klatch, 1994, 200-201). For all its alleged 
subversiveness, 1960s counterculture did not resolve only around women’s lib and civil 
rights, but also around “an emphasis on spontaneity, self-expression … and self-gratification” 
(Klatch, 1994, 201). In short, the 1960s were not only about the promotion of social justice 
and equality, but also about the promotion of a libertarian ideology, according to which “[a] 
healthy society is one of unlimited self-interest” (Klatch, 1994, 203).   
Although it is right to think of the nature of the far-right as a composite movement, it 
is also right to recognise that it developed as a backlash against the demands of post-1850s 
social movements, and against the tenets of general socialist discourse. As Balakrishnan 
writes, “[a] miscellany of opposition to the welfare state, godless Marxism and a more 
nebulously conceived cultural levelling, the ‘revolution from the right’ was essentially a call 
to true elites to stand their ground against a worldwide revolt of the masses” (2017, 19). This 
counterstrike was further invested, Balakrishnan continues, in a wider intellectual discourse 
predicated on an all-encompassing perception of a West in decline – fragmentation, rupture, 
class-conflict –  and in a call to (re)define philosophico-political inquiry within “an epochal 
perspective on the destiny of the Occident” (2017: 19). At the heart of this far-right backlash 
lay – and, as the above invective suggest, still does – first, a vehement opposition to all forms 
of cultural, economic or political levelling – in short, an opposition to all forms of 
egalitarianism – and second, a need to (re)appraise western civilisation as essentially 
masculine. In the socio-political convulsions of post-1850s Europe, the far-right saw the 
“potentials for renewal in the twilight age of Western civilization [that] could only be grasped 
in an encounter with its archaic origins … with Greece, Rome, Judea and Germania being the 
main variants” (Balakrishnan, 2017, 27). And, as far as the extreme right is concerned, one 
cannot get more masculine than the symbolic military excellence of Greece, Rome and 
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Germania, further valorised by the whiter-than-white grace of Christian fundamentalism 
(Hedges, 2008, 73-94).  
 
Conclusion  
In one of his more intemperate addresses to the Greek Parliament, Antonis Samaras – former 
Prime Minister of Greece (2012-2014) and, still in 2015, the most right-wing leader of New 
Democracy (ND), one of Greece’s largest (if not the largest) political parties – argued that he 
was of the “straight, masculine school” and, therefore, a man who spoke directly. In saying 
so, Samaras did not only imply that women are not capable of “straight-talking,” but became 
exasperated when Zoe Konstantopoulou – the then (first female) Speaker of the Greek 
Parliament – accused him of sexism. This example is useful here because ND is – or perhaps, 
was – an example of an ostensibly moderate, centre-right political party, which has 
nevertheless seamlessly absorbed elements of the Greek far-right in ways that are not only 
advantageous but also instrumental to the realisation of its neoliberal objectives. The far-right 
enabled ND to reframe the brutal austerity imposed on Greece by the EU, with a view to 
further bolstering its already noxious anti-immigration rhetoric, and accentuating the cult of 
“straight-talking” masculinity as the most robust form of resistance to the egalitarianism and 
multiculturalism of the left. The cult of this resurgent, emboldened masculinity is prevalent 
not only in Greece, where Golden Dawn’s neo-Nazis burn torches at Thermopylae, but also 
in Britain, where pro-immigration, female politicians like Jo Cox are executed in cold blood, 
and where black, female  politicians like Diane Abbot receive misogynistic abuse on an a 
daily basis; and, of course, also in the USA, where President Trump’s sexism is considered 
by some to be innocent, manly “locker-room banter.” Unless we treat online misogyny 
predominantly as precisely this – the articulation of an increasingly powerful far-right 
populism buoyed by re-energised forms of post-crisis neoliberalism – we run the risk of 
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misunderstanding the vehemence of its discourse, while further demonising working-class 
culture as de facto problematic. More importantly, we run the risk of further obscuring what 
ought to be at the centre of the debate: that online misogyny is the digital transmogrification 
of very real political problems, whose potential solution may only be actualised if material 
equality and social justice become universal conditions of emancipation.   
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1
 See https://yiannopoulos.net/.  
2
 A practice-based dissertation is a third-year project submitted in partial fulfilment of a BA (Hons) degree in 
Media Studies, at the School of Media, University of Brighton.  
3
 Yiannopoulos was banned from Twitter in July 2016.  His handle was @Nero.  
4
 Our students’ edited version of the debate may be found here.  
5
 Doxxing refers to the act of searching and revealing one’s personal and/or sensitive information on online fora.   
6
 I refer here to Etienne Balibar’s concept of egaliberté (see Callinicos, 2006, 47).  
7
 In a recent article, Nancy Fraser argues that the “the hegemonic bloc that dominated American [or Anglo-
American] politics was progressive neoliberalism … [a] real and powerful alliance of two unlikely bedfellows: 
on the one hand, mainstream liberal currents of the new social movements (feminism, antiracism, 
multiculturalism, environmentalism, and LGBTQ rights); on the other hand, the most dynamic, high-end 
‘symbolic’ and financial sectors of the U.S. economy (Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and Hollywood). What held 
this odd couple together was a distinctive combination of views about distribution and recognition” (Nancy 
Fraser, 2017, 46).  
8
 See also Lia Haro and Romand Coles (2017).  
